Acquisition channels such as direct marketing, advertising, public relations and word-ofmouth may generate customers with different lifetime values. We use vectorautoregressive models to assess how these differences unfold over time. The results are used in a marketing decision support system that guides the optimal allocation of the acquisition budget across channels.
INTRODUCTION
Customers are valuable assets for the firm, but they can be costly to acquire and to retain. Customers' heterogeneity in the course of their relationship with the firm is reflected in their price sensitivity, lifetime duration, purchase volume, and even word-ofmouth generation. This heterogeneity causes differences in customers' lifetime value (CLV, hereafter), defined as the discounted stream of cash flows generated over the lifetime of a customer. To the extent that different acquisition strategies will bring different "qualities" of customers, the acquisition effort will have an important influence on the long-term profitability of the firm 1 . Indeed, both practitioners and scholars have emphasized that firms should not spend to acquire just any customer, but the "right" kind of customer (Reichheld 1993; Blattberg and Deighton 1996; Hansotia and Wang 1997; Blattberg, Getz, and Thomas 2001) . Therefore, the customer acquisition process plays an important role in the newly-emerging paradigm of customer equity (CE)
Optimizing the acquisition budget for long-term profitability is particularly relevant for start-ups and for firms competing in growth markets, where the acquisition spending is the most important expense in the marketing budget. In these scenarios, the firm could have an illusion of profitable growth, when in fact it is acquiring unprofitable customers. This occurred for many internet start-ups that spent aggressively on acquisition in an effort to maximize 'eyeballs', with the hope of locking-in customer revenue later. However, that revenue never occurred for many companies, either because their value proposition was not compelling enough, or because the underlying linkage between acquisition spending and long-term profitability was poorly understood.
In order to grow their businesses, companies acquire customers using a variety of channels. In this paper, we define an acquisition channel as any vehicle that initially drives a prospect to the firm. While broadcast media and direct marketing are the most traditional acquisition channels, firms also acquire customers through other vehicles such as public relations and word-of-mouth. Thus it is important to understand the relative effectiveness of these acquisition channels.
In a recent survey to marketing managers of Internet firms, it was found that managers do not predominantly use the channels that they believe are the most effective (Forrester Research 2001) . For example, in this study affiliate programs was said to be very effective, but it was rarely used. This suggests that managers are unclear about the effectiveness of different channels of acquisition. For example, online ad banners have been criticized as ineffective since they drive few click-throughs and exhibit small conversion rates. However, some authors have warned that media that appear as ineffective in the short-run may generate consumer awareness and become effective in the long-run (Briggs and Hollis 1997; Drèze and Zufryden 1998) . Consequently, acquisition-channel effectiveness should be measured with models that can quantify short-run as well as long-run response to marketing stimuli.
The distinction between short and long-run effects is not new in the marketing literature, and several statistical models or experiments capable of capturing this distinction have been proposed 3 . Nevertheless, managers are often criticized as myopic when making spending decisions in that they tend to maximize the short-term and neglect the long-term profitability of the firm. This may occur because the managers' incentives are linked to short-term metrics such as market-share movements. In other occasions managers lack the necessary tools to measure the long-run effects of their decisions. The inability to measure the future consequences of current decisions increases the uncertainty of future payoffs, especially in turbulent markets that are difficult to forecast.
By contrast, short-run metrics such as current market share have a strong credibility at all levels of management and are easy to justify (Keil, Reibstein, and Wittink 2001) .
Nonetheless, neglecting the long-term effects of current actions can lead to suboptimal spending decisions, resulting in inferior long-run profitability and shareholder value creation (Doyle 2000) .
Hence, there is an urgent need to develop models capable of measuring the longrun effects of different acquisition strategies, and to provide systems to help managers optimally allocate their acquisition spending among different channels. These models should be able to disentangle the long-run from the short-run effects, incorporate the risk associated with future payoffs, and take into account the costs associated with different acquisition channels. This is the main objective of the current paper. Moreover, we depart from "soft" metrics of communication effectiveness (e.g., brand awareness) to "hard" metrics of profitability (Greyser and Root 1999) , in that we measure the effectiveness of each acquisition channel with respect to its contribution to the CE of the firm 4 . Once and Siddarth 2002; Nijs et al. 2001) , varying-parameters approaches (e.g., Mela, Gupta, and Lehman 1997; Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta 1999) , and experiments (e.g., Lodish et al. 1995; Anderson and Simester 2001) . For a review of long-run marketing modeling, see Dekimpe and Hanssens (2000) . This paper fits into the emerging literature of linking marketing spending to long-run shareholder value (e.g., Pauwels et al. 2003) 4 Though there exist various definitions of CE, it is defined in this paper as the sum of all exisitng and expected customers' CLVs. Here CE is used as a metric to show the long-run performance of the firm.
these long-run effects have been measured, we can optimally allocate the acquisition budget among the various channels. In doing so, we do not measure the expected CLV of a customer, but rather her CE contribution. In this way a customer is worth not only her own expected CLV but also all the indirect impacts that she has on the firm's performance over time (e.g., by bringing new customers to the firm through word-ofmouth)
The paper is organized as follows. First, we categorize customer acquisition channels to investigate their short-run and long-run differences with respect to the impact on CE. Second, we propose a VAR model to estimate the long-run effect of a customer acquired from each channel on the long-term performance of the company. Third, we provide an empirical illustration using data from an internet start-up. Lastly, we develop a marketing decision support system to help the manager allocate her acquisition budget among the different channels.
RESEARCH DEVELOPMENT
Our study differs from previous literature on media selection in at least three ways. First, we consider important yet under-researched acquisition channels, such as word-of-mouth and public relations. Second, we study long-run effects of the different acquisition channels on the firm's performance, as separate from short-run effects. Third, we specify the long-run effects of acquisition in a customer-equity framework. Thus, our research is particularly relevant for relationship businesses in which the firm spends aggressively on acquiring customers, in the hope of deriving a substantial future revenue stream. Examples include the wireless telephone industry, broadband internet service providers, and cable television.
Classification of Customer Acquisition Channels
Our focus on customer acquisition includes all possible channels that drive new customers to a firm, including those that are difficult to control, such us word-of-mouth.
An increasing number of firms uses such channels. For instance, BMG Music Service not only spends on online ad banners and direct mail, but also gives referral incentives (in the form of free CDs) to existing customers . Netflix, an online DVD rental firm, spends on online ad banners, places free trial coupons in the DVD-players cartons of some manufacturers, mails other free-trial coupons to targeted audiences and encourages referrals, although without monetary incentive.
Our classification is based on two dimensions used in previous research. The first is the acquisition channel's level of contact with the prospect, which can be personal or broadcast. For example, if customers learn about the firm from a friend or from an email, the contact is more personalized than if they learn it from a TV advertisement or a newspaper article. Indeed, in the former, someone decided to send a message to that specific customer while in the latter, the message is available for anyone exposed to the medium. Similar to the concept of audience addressability (Blattberg and Deighton 1991) , we expect personal contacts to have high addressability and broadcast contacts to have lower addressability 5 .
The second dimension is the level of intrusiveness of the acquisition channel, which can be low or high. Following the persuasion knowledge model (Friestad and Wright 1994, 1995) , we predict that perceived intrusiveness has an impact on customer response and subsequent behavior. Indeed, consumers interpret and cope with marketers' communication attempts (e.g., advertising) based on contingent persuasion knowledge.
They understand that the main goal of marketing communications is to influence their own beliefs and/or attitudes about the firm's products or services. Thus, we argue that visibly commercial acquisition channels such as direct marketing or mass advertising will be perceived as more intrusive than channels such as public relations and word-ofmouth 6 .
Our classification of acquisition channels based on the level of contact and level of intrusiveness, results in four categories namely, word-of-mouth (WOM), direct marketing (DM), advertising (AD), and public relations (PR). A wide array of acquisition tactics can be assigned to one of these categories, and we present some of them as an illustration in Figure 1 . This classification is managerially relevant, as it includes many non-traditional but widely used acquisition tactics in a comprehensive way. Moreover, it is based on extant consumer behavior theory and therefore we expect these four categories to differ both in their short and in their long-run effectiveness 7 .
6 Word-of-mouth communications have been suggested to be more persuasive than conventional advertising (e.g., Herr, Kardes, and Kim 1991; Brown and Reingen 1987) . 7 Nevertheless, the development and testing of formal hypotheses on how level of contact and intrusiveness affect short and long-run effectiveness are beyond the scope of this paper. With our particular dataset (introduced below), we cannot control for personal differences among groups, so we do not know whether those differences are caused by the nature of the medium, or by individual characteristics. We run a multivariate discriminant analysis of group membership on some personal demographics and found that there are statistically significant differences in the demographics across groups. Therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that different acquisition channels bring different kinds of customers to the firm.
Insert Figure 1 here

Measuring Acquisition Effectiveness
In this research we develop a metric that helps us link acquisition efforts to shareholder value by measuring the impact of the acquisition spending on customer equity, which has been suggested as a powerful metric for the value of a firm (Gupta, Lehman, and Stuart 2002) . Hence, models capable of maximizing customer equity should help managers maximize shareholder value.
Unlike previous CLV models, our model investigates cross-sectional heterogeneity at the acquisition channel level 8 . For example, previous work has assumed that customers are homogeneous in their expected future value (e.g., Blattberg and Deighton 1996) , or longitudinally heterogeneous depending only on the period of acquisition (e.g., Gupta, Lehman, and Stuart 2002) . However, we expect different acquisition channels to yield customers that are unequal in their contribution to customer equity. This heterogeneity of acquisition channels has important implications for optimal resource allocation, as firms want to allocate their limited acquisition budget among the different acquisition channels so that they maximize their customer equity and therefore shareholder value. We shall emphasize the differences between the short and the long-run effectiveness to illustrate the importance of maximizing the latter when allocating marketing resources. 8 We will investigate how each acquisition channel contributes to the firm's customer equity and study heterogeneity for our four categories of acquisition channels. Our measurement approach could nevertheless be used for any particular acquisition channel or for any other categorization. There could also be heterogeneity at different levels, for instance due to demographic characteristics of the individuals attracted by each channel.
METHODOLOGY
Linkage between Acquisition and Long-Run Performance
The acquisition process and its link with the firm's performance should be examined as a complex system in which many interactions could take place over time.
For example, when computing the marginal contribution of one new customer to CE, we want to measure not only her expected CLV but also all the indirect influences that this acquisition will cause in the firm's performance.
We propose a vector-autoregressive (VAR) model to investigate these interactions which we characterize as follows: (1 restrictions on some of these parameters if there is an a priori reason for doing so. VAR models can be heavily parameterized, depending on the number of variables and time lags in the model. Therefore, long time series are desirable. Note that we do not include marketing activity data (e.g., advertising expenditures, price promotions) since at this point we are not interested in measuring how these marketing efforts lead to number of customers acquired. Instead, we want to measure how much a specific customer contributes to both the present and future firm's performance. The function linking the number of customers acquired to the contribution to the firm's customer equity will be called the value generating function. The interactions between marketing spending and number of acquisitions is captured by an acquisition response function (see Figure 2 ). We will join these two functions later. , ,a 9 A deterministic trend, seasonal dummy variables, and exogenous variables can also be included in this VAR. Instantaneous effects are not included directly in this VAR, but they are reflected in the variancecovariance matrix of the residuals ( Σ )
Given data availability, a VAR model not only captures all the previous effects (i.e., direct, cross, feedback and reinforcement), it also measures the time dynamics of each effect. We are interested in disentangling the immediate and the long-run effects, and in determining the total cumulative effects. This is accomplished by Impulse
Response Functions (IRFs) that trace the present and future response of a variable to an unexpected shock in another variable. VAR models and IRFs have been introduced to the marketing literature in a marketing-mix context (e.g., Dekimpe and Hanssens 1995a , 1995b Bronnenberg, Mahajan, and Vanhonacker 2000; Nijs et al. 2001; Srinivasan, Bass, and Popkowski 2000) . They are used here to assess how one unexpected customer acquisition, for example from the advertising channel, impacts customer equity over time. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of the VAR method to measure the financial contribution of newly acquired customers.
Assuming data stationarity, we can rewrite the VAR model in equation (1) 
{0,..., } i = ∞
We can calculate the cumulated long-run effect of unit impulses in any error shock on another variable by accumulating the impact multipliers,
When variables are stationary, the impact multipliers tend to be zero for sufficiently high numbers of i and therefore the total effect is finite 10 .
In order to estimate the effect of one new customer acquisition from a specific channel on the long-run performance of the firm we take the following steps: (1) estimate the impulse response functions defined as the effect of a one-person shock in the acquisition channel on the firms' performance (V ); (2) select the impact multipliers that are significantly different from zero; and (3) accumulate significant impact multipliers using a discount rate. Thus the long-run impact multiplier for a direct effect is obtained as So long as V is a good proxy for the contribution of each customer to the firm's profits, this impact multiplier can be interpreted as the contribution of one customer acquired through a specific channel to the firm's customer equity before accounting for t 10 When variables are evolving, the standard procedure is to estimate the VAR model with variables in first differences. In those cases, the IRFs should be accumulated to measure the impact on level forms. 11 The discount rate should incorporate the risk associated with the specific investment. For example, factors such as expected future competition or the urgent need to raise money might affect this rate.
differences in acquisition costs 12 . In other occasions, however, V may not be expressed in monetary value. In such cases the impact multiplier needs to be translated to profit contribution, for example,
where ( ) τ i is a function that translates the direct effects (as measured by the impact multipliers) to the firm's profits. This approach may be necessary, for example, for an online newspaper that generates revenue from advertising but can only observe the login behavior of its users 13 . This login behavior would presumably be highly correlated with advertising exposure and, therefore, the firm's financial performance.
In conclusion, we have developed a metric that is capable of measuring the longrun CE contribution of a newly acquired customer. This metric captures not only the expected CLV of a new customer, but also all indirect effects that affect the firm's value through that particular customer acquisition.
EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION
Data Description
We study an internet firm that provided free web hosting to registered users during a 70-week long observation period. At the time of registration, individuals provided a demographic profile and responded to the question "How did you hear about 12 Note that γ k does not take into account that a person acquired from a given acquisition channel, say advertising, could be more expensive to acquire than a person acquired through for instance word-ofmouth. We shall come back to this issue later. 13 This is not necessary if the firm is only interested in finding out which channel is best, assuming that ( ) τ i is the same for all acquisition channels.
our company?" 14 , followed by a list of several acquisition channels. Once registered, individuals' unique behavior was tracked as they logged in to use the firm's services (e.g., changing the content or appearance of their web site, or checking on the number of site visits). From these records, we calculate the weekly total number of unique logins, as well as the number of registrations per acquisition channel. These channels are grouped according to the classification in Table 1 , where we also show some descriptive statistics.
A very small number of registrants who indicated "Other" as their acquisition channel was discarded from this analysis.
Insert Table 1 here
The number of logins is a good proxy for the firm's performance given the characteristics of this business 15 . Most free-service internet companies generate advertising revenue based on logins or click-throughs. Furthermore, once a sufficient number of registrations was achieved, the company switched to a fee-for-service revenue model. As explained in detail in Appendix A, the intensity of login behavior was found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on customers' willingness to pay.
Therefore, acquisition channels that yield customers with high usage (login) intensity and therefore a higher probability of converting to a fee-based service, will be considered as the most effective.
The variables are defined as follows: 
We apply the iterative procedure proposed in Enders (1995, pp. 256-258) to decide whether to include a deterministic trend in the test. The results are shown in Table   2 . All variables except AD were found to be trend stationary in 95% confidence level.
Since it has been argued that conventional unit root tests (e.g., ADF) tend to over-accept the null of unit root, we confirmed our results with the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski et al. 1992 ) that uses the null of stationarity 16 . We found that the two tests disagree for AD and WOM and concluded that all series seem to be stationary at or near the 95% confidence level.
Insert Table 2 here 16 Note that the null hypothesis of the ADF test is that a series has unit root (i.e., evolutionary).
We proceed to estimate the VAR in level form including all performance variables, a deterministic trend 17 t and a dummy variable d, 
The dummy variable is included in order to achieve multivariate normality of the model residuals. This assumption will be needed when deriving the generalized impulse response function (cfr. infra) (Koop, Pesaran, and Potter 1996; Pesaran and Shin 1998) .
Estimating the model without the dummy variables yields residual outliers in five weeks, After accounting for these outliers, the MVN assumption is met, following the Lutkepohl test (1993, p.155-158) . We also test for residual autocorrelation with a portmanteau test (Lutkepohl 1993, p.150-152) and find that the null hypothesis of white noise cannot be rejected.
We find the optimal lag length to be one, using Schwartz' Criterion. Although this VAR model uses 8 parameters per equation, there are sufficient time-series observations (70 weeks) to estimate them. The estimation results are reported in Table 3 , and the impulse response functions are shown in Figure 3 . We use generalized impulse response functions because imposing a temporal ordering of the variables is not credible 17 The standard practice in VAR modeling is to include a deterministic trend when variables are shown to be trend stationary. The decision of whether or not to include the trend is, nevertheless, not trivial. In particular, Sims (1980) and Doan (1992) argue against detrending because that may discard information concerning the co-movements in the data. We decided to detrend the data, following previous VAR modeling in marketing, and because in this application the trend is likely caused by the natural evolution (growth) of the internet market.
in our case. These IRFs are plotted for |t|-statistics exceeding 1, following the procedure in Dekimpe and Hanssens (1999) .
Insert Table 3 here
Results
We interpret the direct, cross and feedback effects of customer acquisition shocks.
These are the most insightful managerially, in particular the direct effects, as they will determine the shape of the value generating function.
Direct Effects. These IRFs measure the total or net effect of an unexpected acquisition on the firm's performance, defined as the total number of logins over time.
The net effect includes not only a new customer's own login activity, but also the effect on the login activity of others (e.g., by encouraging friends to use different service features). The IRFs show that customers acquired through advertising contribute the most to the firm's performance. Using these results, and assuming a discount rate r=0 for simplicity, we calculate the long-term multipliers (equation (4) Consistent with our expectation, we find that each of these multipliers is significantly different from the others at the 5% level, except for the difference between DM and PR 19 .
Insert Figure 3 here
Feedback Effects. Here we investigate how many new customer acquisitions can be generated by an unexpected one-login increase. Indeed, increased usage of the internet service may lead to higher customer satisfaction and reliance on the service, which can 18 We do not make any assumptions on τ(•) yet, as expressed in equation (5). Therefore, these multipliers should be interpreted as the contribution to the firm's total login activity, not to the monetary value of the firm. 19 We tested for the differences in the cumulative impulse response function using Monte-Carlo simulations following the procedure suggested in Lutkepohl 1993 (p. 495) .
create a diffusion effect in the form of additional customer generation. The results show that increased login activity has the strongest feedback effect on public relations and word-of-mouth channels, i.e., as customers become more involved with the service, the firm enjoys higher word-of-mouth generation and also higher media coverage. By contrast, the performance feedback effect is weakest for the direct marketing and advertising channels (see Figure 3) .
Cross Effects. We investigate only the cross effects of the different acquisition channels on the word-of-mouth channel, i.e., how effective are the different acquisition channels at generating future acquisitions through word-of-mouth? Figure 3 shows that customers acquired through advertising are better at word-of-mouth generation than those acquired in other ways. For example, each customer acquired through advertising is expected to bring around 5.4 new customers while a customer acquired from direct marketing is expected to bring only about 0.6 customers. Surprisingly, customers acquired through word-of-mouth are less likely to generate referral customers than those acquired by advertising. These differences are managerially important and require separate research to determine their underlying causes.
Cost-Benefit Analysis
While the VAR model and impulse-response functions have shown that the acquisition channels generate customers of different quality (defined as contribution to CE), these channels have different acquisition costs as well. Therefore we conduct a cost-benefit analysis in Table 4 acquisitions to zero. The metric "benefit per dollar" measures how many additional logins are generated by one extra dollar spent on acquiring customers in each channel.
For example, while customers from advertising have the highest impact on customer equity, they are also the most expensive to acquire. In efficiency terms, advertising is found to be the least cost-effective acquisition channel.
The acquisition channels also show important efficiency differences when measured in the short-run versus the long-run. For example, direct marketing has a benefit per dollar around 5.2 times larger than that of advertising when measured in the short-run (contemporaneous effect), but it is only 3.6 times larger when measured in the long-run (total effect). Thus managers should investigate long-run acquisition benefits of each channel, lest they myopically favor channels with higher short-term performance but lower customer equity contribution.
Insert Table 4
When word-of-mouth acquisition of customers is costless, their benefit per dollar is infinite. However, some firms implement strategies to actively boost word-of-mouth generation by referral incentives, so the question arises what is the maximum amount a firm should be willing to pay for referrals. Table 4 provides an answer to this question by calculating the referral incentive that equates the CE contribution to that of other channels. For instance, given that the total effect of word-of-mouth on the firm's customer equity is 14.03, the firm could spend $149 per referral to obtain the same net benefit per dollar as the one exhibited by a customer acquired through advertising 21 .
A MARKETING DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEM FOR OPTIMAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The previous cost-benefit analysis rank-ordered the different acquisition channels in terms of benefit per dollar (see Table 4 ). This approach, while managerially insightful, has three limitations. First, it assumes that, for each channel, the acquisition cost per customer does not change with the number of customers acquired. This is equivalent to assuming that the acquisition response function is linear with no intercept. Second, it does not address the question of how much to spend on acquisition, nor does it reveal how the budget should be allocated among the different acquisition channels.
In this section, we develop a marketing decision support system (MDSS) to determine the optimal acquisition budget and its allocation across the different acquisition channels. We have argued earlier that the objective should be to maximize customer equity, which is different from maximizing "eyeballs" or customer counts. We will show that, if the manager uses a different objective, the resulting allocation will be suboptimal. Our MDSS is similar to that of Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners (1992) , in that we use submarket (in our case, channel) acquisition response functions to derive optimal spending and allocation across submarkets. Assuming four acquisition channels , we define a concave acquisition response function for each in the form 
where is the contribution margin for each customer acquired from a specific acquisition channel, and k m B is the acquisition budget. We further assume that firms exhaust their entire budget, that is k x B Σ = .
Incorporating Differences in the Contribution to the Firm's Profitability
Allocations that maximize aggregate acquisitions (i.e., k c Σ ) do not necessarily maximize aggregate profits, because customers differ in their customer equity contribution. In contrast to Mantrala, Sinha, and Zoltners (1992) , we incorporate the possibility of different contribution margins for the different submarkets (i.e., k m 23 An estimation alternative to decision calculus would be using a statistical model on historical data. This may present several challenges. First, it may prove difficult to collect data on some channels such as public relations and word-of-mouth. Second, a sufficient number of data points with enough variability are required. Third, the data generation process should be able to predict future behavior. If these requirements are not met, decision calculus may be superior to statistical modeling. An example of a successful implementation of decision calculus may be found in Lodish et al. (1988) . acquisition channels). If the manager's objective is to maximize customer equity, should represent the expected contribution of a new customer acquired through channel k as explained in previous sections. Nevertheless, some managers have a short-term objective and want to maximize profits in the first period of the relationship. We specifically study three decision models, depending on whether the manager maximizes short-term profits or customer equity, and whether the manager takes into account the heterogeneity in the marginal value of customers or not. We show results for these three models and illustrate the effects of a short-term maximization strategy on resource allocation: 
∑
We explained in previous sections why this may not be a good assumption in most scenarios.
Model 2. Different Value in the Short-Term across channels (DVST).
As shown in the empirical illustration, there exists heterogeneity in customers' login activity in function of their acquisition channel. Hence, assuming that each acquisition channel brings the same "average" quality of customers may result in a suboptimal allocation. In this model we account for differences among channels, but only in the short-term. We propose to use the contemporaneous impact multipliers from the IRF in the following way,
( ) example, in our empirical illustration, we estimated the marginal contribution of an acquired customer on the firm's login activity, and we showed how login activity relates to subsequent customer revenue generation.
Model 3. Different Value in the Long-Term across channels (DVLT). Even though
model 2 is superior to model 1 in that it accounts for the differences in the contribution margins across channels, it only incorporates differences in the contemporaneous effects.
In order to obtain long-run differences, we use contributions to the firm's customer equity. For that, we will use the long-term multipliers specified as k λ in equation (5) example, some channels could be superior to others in the short-term, but inferior in the long-term. This information, captured by the value generating function 24 , together with the acquisition response functions, is sufficient to derive the optimal resource allocation.
Since the objective of the firm should be that of maximizing customer equity, we argue that model 3 (DVLT) should be superior.
Numerical Illustration
We provide an illustration using the results from our VAR model 25 on four different acquisition channels. For the parameterization of the value generating functions we use the contemporaneous and the long-term multipliers as reported in Table 4 and we derive customer profitability based on equations (11) We find the optimal acquisition budgets (B * ) for each of these models to be $139,421, $125,959 and $387,296 respectively. There is a substantial difference between 24 We assume linearity in the value generating function. This means that the expected CE contribution of a customer does not depend on the number of customers acquired from that particular channel. 25 We are assuming that the past data generation process is valid for making predictions for the future. Under some circumstances this data would not be valid to be used for prediction purposes. For example, if the life cycle of the firm changes, or a new competitor enters into the market. 26 Since τ(•) is assumed common to all channels, it will not affect the optimal spending in each channel for a specific budget. Nevertheless, it will affect the optimal acquisition budget. For the purpose of this illustration we assume this function to be linear with no intercept and slope 20, which means that each login is worth 20 dollars. 27 Equation (8) has three parameters that are obtained as follows. First, for the saturation level and the intercept we use the maximum and minimum number of registrations during these 70 weeks. We assume no intercept for advertising (AD) and direct mail (DM) since these are channels with higher possibilities of marketing intervention, whereas it is more likely to get customers without investing a penny from channels such as word-of-mouth and public relations. Second, we pick the sensitivity parameter β so that marginal cost is equal to the average cost of the channel (as reported in Table 4) the optimal acquisition budget for model 3 and those for models 1 and 2. Therefore, if the manager's objective is maximizing short-term profits (using either SVST or DVST), she will underspend on acquisition. Figure 5 shows the optimal acquisition budget and allocation of the budget to each channel under different models.
Insert Figure 5 and 6 here
In many firms, the acquisition budget is set by senior management, and the marketing executive only has discretionary power over the allocation of that fixed budget. It is therefore relevant to study the optimal allocation resulting from each of our three models. Figure 6 shows the optimal allocation to each acquisition channel as a percentage of the total budget for each of the three models. The allocations diverge substantially for small values of the acquisition budget, and tend to converge to each other for high values. Indeed, for high values of B , the firm is close to the saturation level of all channels, and therefore one additional dollar spent on any channel has a small impact on profits. On the contrary, for small values of B any small change in the allocation across channels has a substantial impact on profitability. For example, if the firm is maximizing the contribution to customer equity (DVLT), a small budget B will be spent mostly on generating word-of-mouth. However, if the firm is maximizing shortterm profits (either SVST or DVST), it will spend mainly on direct marketing.
Advertising is the channel that should receive the lowest allocation and firms only start to invest in advertising for sufficiently high values of B . When firms maximize customer equity, advertising spending begins when the budget approaches $150,000, but when firms follow SVST, they only start to advertise when B is around $250,000.
In summary, we have developed an MDSS that can incorporate the long-run effects of each acquisition channel along with the acquisition response functions. This model allows us to determine both the optimal acquisition budget and the optimal resource allocation that maximizes customer equity. We have shown that myopically following a short-term maximization strategy will lead the manager both to underspend in acquisition and to allocate a limited budget to channels that exhibit higher short-run returns that are lower in the long-run.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has linked a statistical model capable of measuring the long-run impact of customers acquisitions on customer equity to an MDSS that determines optimal acquisition spending and its allocation across channels. To the best of our knowledge this is the first attempt of its kind. The VAR model allowed us to measure the financial impact of an additional customer on the firm's performance (V ). Thus, we did not explicitly measure the marketing effort (i.e., spending), but rather the result of that effort (i.e., an acquired customer) and how that acquired customer increases the customer equity of the firm. We constructed a metric called the long-term impact multiplier, which generates the intrinsic value of the "typical" customer coming from a specific acquisition channel. This metric, based on impulse response functions, not only captures the dynamic effects that a customer will exhibit in her lifetime, but also the customer's effect on other customers (e.g., generating word-of-mouth or increasing usage level). As such, our metric captures the impact of an additional customer on the customer equity of the firm.
The MDSS demonstrated the sub-optimality of acquisition-budget allocation rules that maximize the short-term profitability of the company. We showed that, when the quality of acquired customers differs across channels, the function that is maximized significantly affects the percentage of budget spent on each channel. Moreover, we
showed that, the smaller the budget, the larger the differences among the three allocation models.
Our measurement and optimization methods are based on a classification of customer acquisition channels that have different levels of intrusiveness and customer contact. We expect these two criteria to have an impact on customers' long-run behavior, and our empirical results confirm this expectation. Nevertheless, we do not test formal hypotheses on these relationships, which we leave as an important area for future research.
Other limitations of our work offer areas for future exploration. First, more research is needed to understand the dynamics of word-of-mouth generation. Estimating an acquisition response function could be especially difficult for word-of-mouth for two reasons: (1) for some firms it may be difficult to "incentivize" word-of-mouth and to know which is the best way to do so (e.g., offering monetary incentives to the source or to the target of word-of-mouth, or to both); (2) it may be difficult to predict customer reaction, especially when firms have never encouraged word-of-mouth before and when customers behave strategically. Second, we do not consider the resource allocation between acquisition and retention. Our MDSS could be extended to include both criteria simultaneously. We hope that this research will enhance an appreciation for the differences in customers' lifetime value and its implication for designing effective customer acquisition strategies.
The relationship between login activity and willingness to pay for a fee-based service
The empirical example offers an unusual opportunity to study the relationship between customer usage levels of a free service and their willingness to pay when the service becomes fee based. During the 70 weeks of our observation period, customers
were not charged for the web-hosting service and did not know the firm intended to change that policy later on. Two weeks after the end of our observation period, the firm announced by email that, in two months' time, users would either agree to pay subscription fees for different service levels, or face the termination of their accounts. We obtained data on which customers declined the fee for service and which ones paid fees for at least one year after the regime switch. We entertain and test the hypothesis that free-usage levels are an indication of inherent customer utility for the service and therefore predict subsequent willingness to pay.
The hypothesis is tested using a binary logit model of customer choice, using individual data on login behavior and various demographic characteristics as independent variables. Formally, we define 1 0 if customer pays PAY if customer abandons
The logit model includes the following covariates:
(1) LOG20: total binary logins during the first 20 weeks of a relationship. Since we observe customers joining the firm at different points in time, we accumulate logins during their first 20 weeks of the relationship 28 . This time period is sufficient to capture a customer's level of use and interest in the service. Furthermore, it allows us to study the login behavior of a large number of customers, i.e., those who registered between week 1 and week 50 of the observation period.
(2) WEEK: week in which the customer registered. This variable allows us to test whether early adopters (customers who joined early) have a higher conversion probability than late adopters. (4) COUNTRY: 1 if US, 0 otherwise. Although most of the firm's customers are based in the US, some were international, so this dummy variable tests for a difference in conversion probability between these nationalities. Since the US was the pioneer in the commercialization of the internet, we expect this indicator to have a positive impact.
(5) EMP: number of employees. The firm expected their service to be most suited to the needs of small firms, because of the ease of use and simplicity of its offering.
Therefore, we expect larger firms to have a smaller conversion probability.
We first estimate a binary logit model on the total sample of customers who registered between weeks 1 and 50 of the observation period. Of these free-service users, only 1,030 (1.1%) chose to stay with the company after the fees were initiated. Thus the 28 Using total logins for each customer during the 70-week period would increase sample size, but make interpretation more difficult. Indeed, a sizeable percentage of registrants do not return to the site past the initial week. In the full sample we could observe, for example, a customer registering in week 70 with an average weekly login of 1, even though (s)he never returned to the site.
occurrence of PAY=1 in our sample is a rare event and the logit model logically predicts that everyone will abandon the service, which results in a 98.9% correct classification rate. Nevertheless, all parameter estimates are found to be statistically significant, and our focal construct LOG20 has a positive impact on the probability of paying (see Table   A .1.).
We also estimated the model with a choice-based sampling method that balances the number of paying customers and defectors (see Ben-Akiva and Lerman 1985) . This technique does not yield consistent maximum-likelihood estimates of the intercept.
Following Manski and Lerman (1977) , we adjust the estimated intercepts for each alternative by substracting from the exogeneous maximum likelihood estimates of the intercept the constant ln( / ) g g S P , where g S is the percentage of observations for alternative g in the sample, and g P is the percentage of observations for alternative g in the population 29 .
The estimation results using the choice-based sample are reported in Table A1 .
The model correctly classifies 90.8% of those who terminate and 86.5% of those who agree to pay. The average predicted probability of retention for our choice-based sample is 0.475, which is very similar to the observed 0.484. Using the revised intercept, the 29 Hence, for our particular estimation results, where we find an estimated intercept of -5.120, we have to revise this intercept through the following steps. We have . The estimated new constants will be -5.12 -3.77 = -8.90 for alternative 1, and 0 -(-0.65) = 0.65 for alternative 0. Finally, since we want to keep alternative 0 normalized to be 0, we should add the constant -0.65 to both alternatives. The resulting revised intercept will be -9.55. For an example implementing this approach for the Multinomial Logit Model see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985, p. 238) . 0.6497 S P = − predicted average retention probability for the population is 0.0107, which is also very close to the observed value of 0.0111.
The results support our hypothesis of a significant and positive effect of a customer's login activity on her subsequent willingness to pay. Therefore, acquisition channels with a higher level of subsequent usage (login) activity will increase the subsequent average conversion rates. The logit results are also consistent with our demographic hypotheses: customers who registered earlier, retailers, US-based firms and firms with fewer employees are more likely to be retained than others.
Finally, we test the relative predictive strength of customer usage levels by estimating a logit model without the demographic covariates. This model correctly classifies 90.5% of the defectors and 84.5% of the future buyers. These numbers are very close to the percentages correctly classified when other predictor variables are included in the model. In fact, the demographic variables only add 0.3 and 2.1 percentage points for correctly classified defectors and paying customers, respectively. Additionally, a model with only demographic variables as covariates classifies correctly 75.9% of the defectors and only 59.0% of the future buyers. Thus it is login activity, and not the customer demographics, that is the leading indicator of subsequent willingness to pay. Note: Should be interpreted as the effect of one customer increase from each channel on the total login activity of the firm. 
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Note: Should be interpreted as the effect of one login activity increase on the number of customers acquired through each channel.
Note: Should be interpreted as the effect of one unit (customer) increase on the total number of customers acquired through word-of-mouth. where, x k : acquisition spending for channel k c k : number of customers acquired through channel k v k, , sv k , lv k : firm value generated from customers acquired through channel k, under models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
